

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2003/06/05 : CIA-RDP81B00401R001500110003-4

3 August 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

OSD, NSC & DIA
review(s) completed.

FROM : NSC Coordinator

SUBJECT : SCC Meeting on Intelligence Matters

1. This meeting is currently scheduled for Thursday, 10 August. The DDCI will be attending with John McMahon.

2. This book has been revised somewhat to reflect your earlier comments and the receipt of new material. Any additional comments you have will be incorporated into the final version the DDCI will use at the meeting.

3. New or changed information in this book is as noted below:

a. Your previous questions or comments are marked with a paper clip. In the case of questions, answers have been provided on the facing page.

b. The agenda and previous meeting's minutes immediately follow this memo. (Note that a new agenda item on the HPSCI request to change the consolidated Presidential Finding has been added.)

c. Agenda Item 1: Procedural Items Remaining From 28 June Meeting (DCI Certification/Review Criteria). Per your instructions the Certification has been rewritten and six cases above and below the line have been included. These will be put into notebooks for the SCC Principals. (The DoD Certification, which was incorporated into the DCI's, is provided for information.)

e. Agenda Item 3: Soviet Nationalities. This paper is not yet in its final form as State is still working. The intelligence input, however, is not expected to change.

(1) A revised background paper at front.

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
S E C R E T

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CL BY 064696

- (2) Section I: A map and chart have been provided at the front (The NSC will distribute to other Principals).
- (3) Section II: After the basic paper are attached [redacted] k's comments, some State comments, and two inputs from [redacted] regarding resource implications and feasibility. (Answer to question in DCD section provided.)
- (4) Section IV: Pages 5 and 6 of the basic paper (Conclusion and Observations) have been rewritten.

f. Agenda Item 4 (new item): HPSCI Letter Requesting Changes to Consolidated Presidential Finding. Since the DCI received a copy of this letter work was already underway to prepare a response. A draft currently being coordinated is provided.

See rough changes pl



78-9016/6

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3992XX

SECRET

July 5, 1978

DD/S&T# 3023-78

MEMORANDUM FOR:

NSC REVIEW COMPLETED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT:

Summary of Conclusions for June 28 SCC
Meeting

Attached is the "Summary of Conclusions" for the June 28
SCC meeting.

This summary is to be held very closely, and distributed only to
those officers in your department or agency with a strict need to
know.

Christine Dodson
Christine Dodson
NSC Staff Secretary

Attachment

SECRET

Z. Brzezinski

CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1 (S) (C) (1)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON

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Certification/Review Criteria

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NSC REVIEW
COMPLETEDSPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

June 28, 1978

Time and Place: 10:30-11:30 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Sensitive Intelligence Collection Operations

Participants:

State
*Warren Christopher, Deputy Sec.NSC
Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)Defense
Charles Duncan, Deputy Sec.CIA
Admiral Stansfield Turner, DCI
John McMahon,
Deputy Director for OperationsJCS
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith,
Ass't. to Chairman, JCSOMB
***Bowman Cutter, Exec. Associate
Director for BudgetJustice
Attorney General Griffin BellWhite House
Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)
**David Aaron

- * Not present during first 15 minutes of meeting.
- ** Not present during first five and last five minutes of meeting.
- *** Present only during last 10 minutes of meeting.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONSAnnual Report

① The meeting was devoted entirely to further consideration of the DCI's Annual Report on Sensitive Collection Operations, as required by E.O. 12036, and was a direct continuation of the meeting of June 20, 1978, which also dealt with this subject. Criteria for selecting operations for review were read by the Chairman as set forth in the DCI's Memorandum for the President of 7 January 1978, which the President had specifically approved. The Attorney General reported that he had reviewed the language of the Executive Order and the criteria set forth in the DCI's memorandum and was satisfied that the procedure being followed was entirely in conformance with requirements of the law.

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As a result of the review of the various categories of sensitive operations which then followed, based on briefing books Admiral Turner made available to each participant, the following requirements for further reporting were agreed upon by the committee: 25X1D

②

NSC

③

HUMINT Operations: Discussion of the problem of defining sensitivity in these relationships was summed up by the Chairman with the formulation that they should be judged on the basis of productivity and political sensitivity. If, in the extreme case that productivity had declined while political sensitivity had increased, a given operation would have to be considered for termination. The Attorney General stressed that the exercise of this judgment had in the first instance to depend upon the DCI; this was what the President desired and what was required legally. The DCI observed that none of the operations he listed as particularly sensitive had suffered a significant drop in productivity nor a striking increase in political sensitivity during the past year. The Chairman suggested that the DCI provide the SCC with written certification to this effect and the Attorney General agreed that this would complete the requirements of the review process.

④

Certification of Other Sensitive Operations: It was also agreed that sensitive liaison operations, military intelligence operations and operations in Communist countries should be subject to the same kind of certification which the DCI will present to the SCC meeting scheduled for July 25, 1978.

⑤

"Micro-Management" by the SSCI of the Covert Action Infrastructure: The DCI described actions by the SSCI to remove covert action funds on an individual country basis from the Agency's budget requests for maintenance of the covert action infrastructure and a SSCI threat to withhold all infrastructure funds if CIA does not accede to the committee's desire to review the infrastructure on an item-by-item basis. The Attorney General commented that this procedure exceeded requirements for Executive Branch briefing of the Congress and the Chairman observed that it could also violate the requirement for protection of sources and methods which the President had recently strongly reiterated to the DCI and which was being applied even in the current SCC review process. The group concluded that annual review of the infrastructure constituted an adequate basis for reporting to the SSCI that these operations were being carried out according to legal

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requirements. The Chairman will suggest to the President that he tell Senator Bayh that the DCI and SCC have reviewed the infrastructure according to the standards which the President has set and that he will not permit provision of * additional detail.

6 Adequacy of Review Criteria: Mr. Christopher, when the review of the activities in the lists presented by the DCI had been completed, said he still had worries about the adequacy of the standards. The Attorney General stated that the standards set by the President were based on trust in the DCI's integrity and judgment, his sensitivity about selecting operations for review and his lack of desire to continue operations which had outlived their usefulness or entailed great political risk. To allay Mr. Christopher's doubts, the Chairman suggested that the DCI bring to the July 25 meeting examples of operations that he considered borderline cases--operations on the margin of selection for review as specially sensitive but which, for one reason or another, he had not included on his lists. In this way, the Chairman passed, the group could test the DCI's application of the standards the President set.

7 Harassment in Moscow: The DCI said at the end of the meeting he wished to express to the Committee his growing concern about actions the Soviets were taking against Americans in Moscow, and his feeling that the situation was getting out of balance. He urged that the Committee consider a coordinated response to the Soviet offensive. The Chairman agreed that the subject was very important, noted that certain actions were currently under way and suggested that everyone be prepared to discuss further steps, such as expulsions of Soviet intelligence operators from the United States, in the near future.

* ER 74-9016/5
conveying President's
approval. DDO preparing DCI letter to Sen. Bayh.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

ECT: (Optional)

SENSITIVE COLLECTION OPERATIONS

FROM:		EXTENSION		NO.
Acting DDO				DATE 14 July 1978
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)		DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.	DCI			<p>Attached is a draft of a memo from the DCI to Dr. Brzezinski certifying that he had reviewed and approved sensitive collection operations and special activities. This certification is in response to requirements generated at the 28 June SCC meeting according to the following minute items (minutes attached).</p> <p>Item 3 of SCC minutes --</p> <p>The DCI is to certify that none of the HUMINT operations he listed as sensitive had suffered a significant drop in productivity or a striking increase in political sensitivity. The Attorney General agreed that this certification would complete the requirements of the review process.</p> <p>Item 4 of SCC minutes --</p> <p>Similarly, the DCI should certify that no sensitive liaison operation, military intelligence operation, or operation in Communist countries listed as particularly sensitive had suffered a significant drop in productivity or a striking increase in political sensitivity during the past year.</p> <p>Item 6 of SCC minutes --</p> <p>The Chairman suggested that to illustrate the DCI's standards for determining the sensitivity of operations, the DCI bring to the 25 July meeting examples of operations that he considered borderline cases -- operations on the margin of selection for review</p>
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USE ONLY☐ SECRET/SENSITIVE/CONFIDENTIAL☐ SECRET

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

ECT: (Optional)

PAGE 2

SENSITIVE COLLECTION OPERATIONS

FROM:		EXTENSION		NO.	
				DATE	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)	
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED			
1.				<p>as specially sensitive but which had not been included for review. Tab A of the attached certification statement contains sanitized summaries of nine sensitive cases which <u>were</u> included in the DCI review list, but which were judged by the Divisions to be the least sensitive of those included. Tab B contains nine sanitized summaries of cases the Divisions identified as the most sensitive of cases <u>not</u> selected for inclusion on the DCI review list. These cases include both human and technical DDO cases.</p> <p>Also included in the attached certification statement is a general review of the procedures for approving new DDO operations, which may be of interest to Dr. Brzezinski and to other members of the SCC.</p> <p>cc: DDO</p>	
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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman
Special Coordination Committee

SUBJECT : Certification of My Review of Sensitive
Collection Operations and Special Activities

1. I have reviewed the sensitive foreign intelligence collection programs of the CIA and the Department of Defense which were presented to the SCC on 28 June 1978. These sensitive collection programs included sensitive liaison activities, technical collection programs, as well as human intelligence collection operations. I certify that, in my judgment, none of these programs, since their inception or during the past year, has suffered a significant drop in productivity or a striking increase in sensitivity.

2. I have also reviewed the Special Activities conducted by the CIA which require a Presidential Finding under Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. I certify that, in my judgment, each of these ongoing activities is adequately covered and authorized by a currently valid Presidential Finding.

3. You may also be interested in the routine review and approval process through which an operational proposal must pass before it is approved for implementation. In the CIA, these proposals are usually generated by case officers in the field or by officers on the Directorate of Operations country desks and are in response to collection requirements levied on the Directorate of Operations in the form of Operating Directives which detail each Station's collection objectives. In every case, Chiefs of Station must approve the suggested operation and are required to keep Chiefs of Mission fully and currently informed about all CIA programs and activities carried out in their countries of accreditation. Authority to approach specific individuals and to obligate resources is obtained from Headquarters at a level commensurate with the significance of the operation. The Branch Chief and Division Chief will be aware of all new operations and will specifically approve their inception. Operations of increased scope or importance are referred to the Deputy Director for Operations or to the DDCI or DCI for approval. Regular operational reporting from the Stations, field intelligence reporting which is constantly monitored, and periodic Station performance reports ensure that the Deputy Director for Operations and I are fully informed of the most significant and sensitive field initiatives and ongoing operations.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET/[REDACTED]

Classified by DCI
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption schedule SB (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Indefinite to Determine

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4. In the Department of Defense new proposals are reviewed by the originating Unit Commander and through the appropriate chain of command to the Office of Deputy Director, Collection Operations, DIA. At each level the new proposals are subjected to a thorough examination in terms of risk versus gain as well as of the validation of the requirements. DIA has been furnished a sanitized copy of the Agency's instruction on restrictions on operational use of certain categories of individuals and occupations. Once DIA has approved the new proposals, they are forwarded to the Military Liaison Branch of the Policy and Coordination Staff of the Directorate of Operations of CIA.

5. This Branch reviews the proposals and forwards them to the appropriate CIA Operations Directorate's area division to ensure that there are no conflicts with or duplications of already existing programs. At this point an additional review is made to ascertain whether or not any of the proposed assets or their occupations fall within the prohibited or restricted categories of persons, occupations, or activities. A final determination is made to ensure that the proposals are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and the potential political risks should the activity be disclosed are weighed against the potential value of the information to be gained.

6. Finally, there are certain technical programs under the aegis of the Directorate of Science and Technology which are also submitted to appropriate review. The satellite program of the Directorate of Science and Technology is reviewed and carried out under the direction of the National Reconnaissance Office. Each proposal for a new system is reviewed by the NRO, OMB, the DCI, and is approved by the President. In addition, the Directorate of Science and Technology develops certain types of sensors for clandestine deployment by the Directorate of Operations. These operations are reviewed by the Deputy Director of Operations and the Deputy Director of Science and Technology to weigh the risk of exposure versus the value of the data to be derived and are approved by the DCI. 25X1A

STANSFIELD TURNER

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Executive Registry

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0003-4016



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

27 JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Assessment of Sensitive Operations

(S) At the SCC meeting on June 28, 1978, it was requested that certain military operations be reviewed again to assess productivity and sensitivity and to ascertain that the balance between productivity and sensitivity is, and is likely in the near term to remain, appropriate. That assessment is set out below. 25X1C



(C) The productivity of each operation is measured in numbers and quality of intelligence information reports (IIR) produced. Through an analysis of IIR evaluations, we can determine the strengths and/or weaknesses of the clandestine activity. The operational element reviews each operation in terms of productivity versus sensitivity on a monthly basis. A similar review is conducted by the respective Military Departments semi-annually and DIA reviews each clandestine collection operation once a year or whenever a significant change is proposed.

WARNING NOTICE
Sensitive Sources and
Methods Involved

Classified by DepSecDef

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE ON INDICATOR, OF 1993

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
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(C) The question of political sensitivity is addressed at each stage of a collection operation along with other security and risk considerations. A new proposal receives a thorough evaluation in terms of risk versus gain by each level of command. Additionally, as the DCI, you review all clandestine proposals or activities to ensure they are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and to weigh the potential political costs which might result from their possible disclosure.

(S) It is our judgment that DoD clandestine collection operations in Eastern Europe should not be characterized as particularly sensitive and that they have not experienced a significant drop in productivity nor an increase in sensitivity during the reporting period.



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T O P S E C R E T

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20 July 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

FROM :

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT : SCC Meeting on Sensitive Collection and Covert Action

1. The NSC has cancelled subject meeting previously scheduled for Tuesday, 25 July. They are going to try to reschedule it for Thursday, 3 August.

2. This book contains the first cut at material for that meeting.

a. The first section (clear tab) deals with Soviet Nationalities. Since the final State paper has not been provided to Principals by the Working Group, DDO has attempted to lay out the current status of this item.

b. The second section (red tab) treats the [REDACTED] operations question. DDO has provided the paper sent to Principals and suggested talking points.

c. The third section (blue tab) deals with items carried over from the last meeting: Certification and Adequacy of Review Criteria. The first paper in this section, prepared by DDO, treats both items together. The next two papers (from DD/CT and DDS&T) only provide some examples of items not considered sensitive enough to have been presented to the SCC for approval. Since the format of the DDO's package seems most appropriate for answering the mail, it remains only to select those few cases which should be presented to the SCC as not sufficiently sensitive to warrant SCC review.

(Note: DoD is providing a separate draft certification of sensitive operations in Eastern Europe. It has been promised by noon Friday, 21 July. This can be reviewed and incorporated in the final Certification drawn up for submission to the SCC.)

[REDACTED]
NSC Coordinator
Executive Secretariat

cc: DDCI

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T O P S E C R E T

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July 5, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:


NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for June 28 SCC Meeting

Attached is the "Summary of Conclusions" for the June 28 SCC meeting.

This summary is to be held very closely, and distributed only to those officers in your department or agency with a strict need to know.


Christine Dodson
NSC Staff Secretary

Attachment

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Z. Brzezinski

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON

TAB^S

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science & Technology

25X1A FROM:

[REDACTED]
Chief, East Asia Division

25X1A

[REDACTED]
Director of SIGINT Operations

SUBJECT:

Talking Points for the Special Coordination
Committee Submission on USG Signals Intelli-
gence Collection Program [REDACTED]

25X1D

CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Science & Technology

Date

Deputy Director for Operations

Date

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date

25X1A

ORIG:CEA/[REDACTED] 9085 20 July 1978

Distribution: :
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Soviet Nationalities

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10 AUG
1978

Soviet Nationalities

1. The principal objective of this meeting is designed to underscore the importance of the Soviet nationalities and to address the attention of the participating agencies to the need to increase their efforts in this area.

2. There is some danger that the Department of State will propose a series of further studies which may have the ultimate effect of delaying any serious consideration of U.S.G. efforts in this area in the near term. Further research may be necessary to fine-tune the thrust and direction of programs, but it is not necessary to make a judgment that more work needs to be done.

3. The Department of State can be expected to be concerned that an increased program in this area could be interpreted as a signal from the Soviet Union of an escalation of pressure.

4. The re-ordering of priorities in the research, analytical and collection fields may be required as a result of this survey. The Office of Comptroller indicates that on the basis of DCID 1/2 that Soviet nationalities have a very low priority ranking. The SCC is, inter alia, focussing on the question of priority ranking. Therefore, I believe that the Comptroller's comment should be held in abeyance until the SCC has made a judgment on the relative importance of this subject.

5. There are a number of specific things that can be done that will be most productive. In the attached papers you have several specific suggestions concerning [] OCR and DCD. The State Department in its recommendations have picked up certain of these points. Not specifically mentioned is increased debriefing of the Soviet emigres. It would appear possible to identify larger numbers of Soviet emigres from the nationality areas and debrief them selectively for intelligence. This would be a comparatively modest effort. (I believe The State Department pages tends to overemphasize the risks (page 2)) I would suggest that increased funding of external research on Soviet nationalities could be particularly helpful in this area. E.g., I foresee the possibility of

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6. I have also been advised informally that the timing might be right for a non-U.S.G. funded interview

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25X6

program [REDACTED]. This area should be explored further. USIA had been interested in such an activity two or three years ago but certain objections were raised and the project was not continued. I believe that the principal objections came from the American Embassy [REDACTED]

25X6

7. I have not mentioned covert action programs and I do not believe there will be any significant discussions of these programs at the 11 August meeting. We have provided a historical backdrop paper. As you are aware we are currently exploring the feasibility of a pilot project focussed on Central Asia. This project would include increased distribution and possibly the stimulation of research in Europe on the Central Asian area. We have sufficient current policy approvals to proceed with general distribution programs vis-a-vis the USSR. Any consideration of new programs, beyond the Central Asian pilot program, would be a consequence of the SCC deliberations now underway.

BACKGROUND ON SOVIET NATIONALITIES SCC ITEM:

1. The SCC/SAWG met on 23 June and 19 July on this subject, as a follow-up to the taking that emerged from the 20 June SCC meeting. These meetings have focussed on the State Department Top Secret paper which identified five key areas to pursue. The state of play is as follows:

- The statement of the problem (I) has been agreed upon by the key agencies and will be circulated to the principals,
- A paper on the subject of increasing U.S. understanding of Soviet nationalities (II) has been drafted by State and has received inputs from other Agencies. It is close to being a coordinated paper as it reflects most of the criticisms made about an earlier draft. CIA has produced three useful papers which permit us to be responsive to a request for increased effort in this area. This response would require certain additional resources, particularly in the case of [] and certain adjustments in collection priorities. If we were to raise the collection priority for information on Soviet nationalities, it would include DCD, but it might also affect [] the overall Soviet HUMINT collection program, and SIGINT. For your use, we have attached the individual CIA submissions and an Office of Comptroller appreciation of the resource implications involved.
- Consideration on increasing contacts between East and West (III)* has been defined as exclusively a State Department responsibility. We are awaiting State's draft which will be made available to the principals.

STATSPEC

25X1A

*will NOT be
furnished
per CIA/DOO
11 Aug*

- The covert action section (IV) was prepared by CIA and reflects a partial look at our overall programs against the USSR. Our charge by the SCC and SAWG was to look at those

S E C R E T

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programs that were focussed on the Soviet minority nationalities. As you can see, some of our efforts only marginally concern the minorities. The paper which I am forwarding herewith does not reflect an agreed SAWG paper, but I believe it is consistent with the discussion which took place at the 19 July SCC/SAWG meeting. We are awaiting formal coordination from State and Defense on the section concerning conclusions and observations. If we sort out an agreed text, the section will be circulated to the principals. There is less pressure on getting this paper into the hands of the principals at this point, as a policy vis-a-vis the nationalities will emerge out of the discussion of the first three sections. Covert action will be a follow-up and consequence of these considerations. Further, the SCC on the 16th of May tasked CIA with exploring the feasibility of a program aimed at [redacted]

25X1C

25X1C

[redacted] In the materials that we are forwarding to you for the SCC discussion on nationalities, we have provided a draft memorandum to you on the status of our explorations in this area. We do not believe that we are sufficiently far advanced to make this a subject for discussion at the 10 August SCC meeting.

25X1C

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20 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: SCC/Special Activities Working Group Meeting,
19 July 1978, to discuss U.S. Policy on Soviet
Nationalities

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Paul Henze, NSC (Chairman); 2 DOD:
Col. Jack Wolcott, JCS, Capt. Don Nielson,
O/SecDef; 3 DOS: Emerson Brown, INR/DDC,
William Luers, Deputy Ass't Secretary of
State for European Affairs, Jim Hough, INR,
Soviet Affairs; 3 CIA: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Ass't NIO/SOV/EE, Self

25X1A

25X1A

1. This meeting was devoted to examining the follow-up actions taken by the Department of State and CIA in preparation for the SCC meeting on Soviet nationalities, scheduled for 25 July. The actions discussed follow the outline paper provided by the Department of State at the SCC meeting of 20 June. The SCC meeting requested the participating agencies to focus on a Department of State outline which included the following points:

- I - State of the Problem (with Annex)
- II - Increasing USG Understanding of Soviet Nationalities
- III - Increasing Contacts and Flow of Information Between US and Soviet Nationalities
- IV - Covert Action Programs
- V - Policy Considerations

2. The presentations to the SCC will follow the I - V breakdown noted above:

I. The statement of the problem, as drafted by the Department of State, has been coordinated with CIA and the Department of Defense. This paper will be formally submitted to the SCC as an agreed statement.

II. Contributions on this section have been received from the Department of State and several units within CIA. The Department of State has been tasked to provide a brief summary of current efforts and needs. The

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Departmental paper will focus on shortcomings and make certain recommendations for SCC considerations. State will circulate this paper by LDX before the close of business on 21 July. The Working Group observed that these contributions provided some useful areas for exploration and action. These considerations, if approved, would require resource reallocations and some adjustments in collection priorities.

III. The section on dealing with increased contacts between U.S. and Soviet nationalities was the responsibility of the Department of State to prepare in conjunction with ICA and BIB. The SAWG did not feel that the papers in hand were adequate. The Department of State was tasked to attempt to produce a more meaningful contribution including some recommendations for increased contacts. Such recommendations would then be available to the SCC for our consideration. The Department of State hopes to make available by LDX proposed text by close of business 21 July.

IV. A CIA paper on covert action programs, particularly focussed on Soviet nationalities, was reviewed. The SAWG accepted the analytical portions of the paper but made several recommendations and comments concerning the conclusions and observations included in the paper. CIA was tasked to revise this section and circulate the revisions for comment by the Departments of State and Defense. It was left open ended as to whether this paper would be circulated to the principals for the SCC meeting. Mr. Henze made two observations on this subject: First, he thought that the basic issue of U.S. policy towards Soviet nationalities needed to be dealt with before there was a broad consideration of the ways in which covert action could support the policy. Second, he noted that the SCC on 16 May had authorized CIA to explore the feasibility of a program aimed at [REDACTED] CIA representatives at the SAWG noted that they were examining the status of their feasibility survey but they did not believe they would be far enough along to provide the SCC with a status report at the 25 July meeting. CIA will look further into this question.

V. This section will not be focussed on as a separate item at the next SCC meeting.



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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

June 20, 1978

Time and Place: 3:45 - 4:45 PM, White House
Situation Room

Subject: Sensitive Collection & Covert Action

Participants:

State
Warren Christopher
Deputy Secretary

White House
Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)
David Aaron

Defense
Charles Duncan, Deputy Sec

NSC
Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)

JCS
Lt. Gen. Wm. Smith

CIA
Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
John McMahon, DDO

Justice
Griffin Bell

*OMB
James McIntyre, Director
Bowman Cutter, Executive
Associate Director for
Budget

*Both OMB attendees were present only for the final portion of the meeting.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Excerpt

Soviet Nationalities:

The committee agreed that the proposals in State's paper on Soviet nationalities for further studies and operational planning were good and that work on this subject should move ahead rapidly. The Chairman directed that a Working Group be set up to guide this work so that the Committee could review the results and reach firm decisions within 3-4 weeks.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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June 6, 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE


Subject: United States Policy on Soviet Nationalities

Attached is a paper concerning United States policy toward the Soviet nationalities issue which was requested by the SCC.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Nationalities Paper



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
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
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This map and the accompanying bar graph will be distributed to all principals for reference in the discussion of Soviet minorities. The bar graph is of particular interest in that it shows that the Russian ethnic proportion of the overall Soviet population is expected to decline from 55% in 1959 to 47% in 2000, and that the Central Asian minorities should increase their share of the population from 8% to 18% during the same period.





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NATIONALISM IN THE USSR
The minority problem & help locate the good paper

I. The Problem

A. Historical Background

The Soviet Union is, as was the Russian Empire before it, a multi-ethnic state with commensurate potential for eruptions on nationality/ethnic grounds. Since emerging from its central forest confines in the mid-fifteenth century, the expanded Russian state has acquired one-sixth of the globe's land mass and well over one hundred different peoples, each with its own history, culture, and language.

Indeed, nationality questions -- including the issue of Russian nationalism -- have been a recurrent problem throughout Soviet history. Although their potential threat to national security has always been diminished by the lack of unity among non-Russians, the authoritarian, centralized regime has not hesitated to take whatever repressive measures it has deemed necessary to end occasional turbulence. However, both the philosophy of the regime and its policies, especially in the post-Stalin period, have willy-nilly led to increasing manifestation of nationality problems rather than solving them.

B. The Peoples of the USSR

Over one hundred different peoples reside within Soviet borders, but only twenty-two have populations above one million (Table 1). The regime from the outset paid obeisance to the situation by recognizing the ethnic principle in its federal state structure. Fifteen nationalities now have their own Union-Republic in which, with two exceptions, they are the majority nationality (Table 2). (In Central Asia the Kazakhs are a minority in their own republic, and the Kirgiz form only a plurality in theirs.) Many other nationality/ethnic groups have their own territorial-administrative regions, although of lesser status and subordinated to one of the fifteen republics. According to the 1970 nation-wide census, the fifteen nationalities of Union-Republic stature break down as follows:

-- the Slavs (178.8 million out of a total Soviet population of 241.7 million): Russians (129.0 million)

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Ukrainians (40.8 million); and Belorussians (9.1 million);
-- the Central Asians (19.5 million): Kazakhs (5.3 million); Uzbeks (9.2 million); Tadzhiks (2.1 million); Turkmen (1.5 million); and Kirgiz (1.5 million);
-- the Transcaucasians (11.2 million): Georgians (3.1 million); Armenians (3.6 million); and Azerbaydzhanis 4.4 million);
-- the Balts (5.1 million): Estonians (1.0 millions; Latvians (1.4 million); and Lithuanians (2.7 million);
and
-- the Moldavians (2.7 million).

II. The Major Challenges

A. Great Russian Nationalism

In recent demographic trends, popular sentiments, and philosophical reflections over the import and impact of past policies have imparted new vigor to discussions of what the proper relationship should be between the politically, economically, and culturally dominant Russians and their fellow Soviet citizens. Khrushchev's abandonment of Stalin's Russocentric policy and burgeoning Soviet Central Asian Muslim populations have been major precipitants of this reevaluation.

Numerically, the Russians still constitute a majority of the population. But demographic trends are making them a declining majority (54.6 percent in 1959; 53.3 percent in 1970), which will probably drop to 45 percent and possibly less by the end of the century. However, with their fellow Slavs -- the Ukrainians and the Belorussians -- they would still comprise an impressive three-fifths to two-thirds of the population. Even after A.D. 2000, moreover, we do not expect to see a meaningful decline in the Russian dominance of the Soviet body politic.

Moscow has always found it difficult to contain the Russian nationalist sentiments it has on occasion inflamed to suit its own needs. By all reports, the ranks of the anti-Western, neo Slavophile components have been swelling in recent years. Racist attitudes, much more virulent than realized by most outsiders, are likely to lead to heightened

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ethnic tensions as the increasing Muslim presence makes itself felt and Russian chauvinism -- not necessarily confined to Russians, for assimilated local elites tend to suffer the "more Catholic than the Pope" syndrome -- is exacerbated. The resulting domestic tensions are more likely to lead to greater regime rigidity, and thus make it more difficult for exponents of reform at home and accommodation abroad to argue their case, than to strengthen the case for reform and retrenchment abroad.

Leadership caution on the issue would seem to imply awareness of the dangers. Together with the tensions abroad caused by Soviet saber rattling, heightened ethnic tensions would add to domestic insecurity. They would mean an increasingly unpopular sighting of the civilian economy to bolster the military and security apparati. Relations with the "fraternal" socialist governments in Eastern Europe and communist parties elsewhere would become further complicated.

B. Ukrainian Nationalism

Ukrainians (also known as Little Russians) have demonstrated on several historic occasions the kind of virulent anti-Russian nationalism which constitutes a grave danger to the state. Their desire for independence or at least autonomy was exploited by the Germans with varying success in both World Wars. Ukrainians have prior historical claims on the Russian state, were long independent of the Tsarist empire, have a history of conflict with the Russians, and have suffered massive and prolonged attempts at Russification. Ukrainians resisted Bolshevik rule at first, suffered terribly under Stalin, surrendered en masse to the invading Germans in 1941, endured periodic waves of Russification in the post-war period, and were deported in large numbers. The 40.8 million Ukrainians, however, still comprise a potentially serious challenge to the Russians -- although both are experiencing declining birth rates -- and they inhabit some of the richest farming and industrial areas of the Soviet Union. In brief, the Ukraine has many of the requirements of a national state.

However, Ukrainians are not united in their attitudes toward Moscow. Many Western Ukrainians became Soviet only in the closing days of World War II; their political memories are Austrian, Polish, or Czechoslovak, and many are Uniates or Byzantine-rite Catholics.

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This is not the case with most Ukrainians living in the eastern regions of the republic, who share a common religion and a long history of political union with the Russians, and owe allegiance to the Moscow Patriarch. Many of them, especially in the industrial centers, are Russified to a considerable degree.

Many Ukrainians, in fact, are more than willing to cooperate with the Soviet system in order to advance. Together with Russians, they are often widely dispersed outside their home republics, frequently occupying key leadership positions, and are usually thought of by the local peoples as essentially Russians.

C. Central Asia: Demographic Time Bomb?

The major nationality spector raised by demographic trends per se is that the skyrocketing Central Asian Turkic populations, now numbering 19.5 million, pose a long-term challenge to the demographic balance, cultural cohesiveness, and economic development of Russian-dominated Soviet society. Present birthrates in Soviet Central Asian republics -- 2-1/2 to 3 times higher than the national average and apparently still rising -- lead demographers to postulate that by the year 2,000 the overall Soviet Turkic population (in Central Asia, the Transcaucasians and the Russian Republic) could more than double to over 75 million, and constitute around 25 percent (up from 14.5 percent in 1970) of the total population, and perhaps over a third of the younger generation.

The potential challenges of these at least culturally Islamic populations, however, is not only one of size but also of bridging the socio-economic-political-cultural gulf separating Central Asians from Russians and other Slavic and European Soviet peoples as well. For example, in terms of complete linguistic assimilation (language claimed as first, or "mother-tongue", on the census), the trend among non-Russians throughout the entire southern tier of Soviet republics (the Transcaucasus and Central Asia but excluding Kazakhstan) is away from Russian (3.5 percent in 1959 down to 3.0 percent in 1970), compared to a positive trend at a higher level in all the other republics (12.7 percent in 1959 up to 14.4 percent in 1970). Although impossible to

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quantify, Muslim cultural consciousness also seems to be strengthening. Muslim intellectuals, report some observers, are today reexamining, and gaining a deeper appreciation of their classical, pre-Soviet cultural roots.

Furthermore, national labor force growth rates and manpower trends indicate that the Central Asian populations will of necessity become a major source for replenishment of the industrial labor force. Although manpower shortages already are developing outside Central Asia, Central Asians show little propensity for leaving their homes to work elsewhere. Consequently, it is likely that funds will increasingly have to be diverted to building new plants in Central Asia rather than to renovating older factories elsewhere, even though the rural character of Central Asian labor means, at least initially, lower rates of worker productivity and thus return on investment. This expanded industrial base is also likely to fuel rather than dampen local nationalisms.

Manpower trends will also impact on the ethnic make-up, fighting skills, and perhaps even trustworthiness of the armed forces. The military faces a growing number and proportion of non-Slavic, rural draftees who will have to be trained in the Russian language and introduced to modern military technology. By the year 2000, for example, one-third of all 18-year-old draftees will hail from the southern tier republics, compared to about one-fifth in 1970. Observers already report complaints from the mostly Russian or otherwise Slavic officer corps about the "yellowing" of the Soviet armed forces.

The Muslim peoples are linked by ties of race, language, and religion. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that they would necessarily act in unison in all circumstances. They have long and diverse histories and economies and their attitude towards Russians varies widely.

III. Attempted Solutions and National Aspirations

A. The Two-Track Policy

For the past 40 years, Moscow has courted the traditional loyalties of the Great Russians, especially in time of grave threat to national security, whether real or contrived. At the same time, as epitomized in the Stalinist slogan "nationalist in form, socialist in content", the regime has attempted to assimilate the various nationalities of the USSR into a socialist system of shared "Soviet" values while paying necessary respect to their individual national heritages, customs, languages, etc. This policy has had at best only limited success, for educating peoples about their past has generated

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among them a far greater sense of national identity than many have had throughout history. Senior Party ideologist Suslov, for example, has admitted that ethnic antagonisms constitute one of the three main obstacles on the road to building communism.

Under Stalin, a heavy-handed Russian nationalist approach stressed the continuity and political primacy of the Great Russian people and their heritage. Official policy assumed the permanence of nationality differences and acted accordingly. The USSR today is still confronted with the unpleasant consequences of this line, which led to brutalities against nationality groups such as the Crimean Tatars.

Khrushchev attempted to adopt a more internationalist approach which held up the long-term goal of "drawing together" (sblizhenie) and eventual "merger" (sliyanie) of national heritages and even biological characteristics into a single, homogeneous national family. However, even theoretical discussions of the long-term "merger" objective caused such consternation among the nationality groups that public emphasis is now almost exclusively on "drawing together." (See insert on 6A.)

B. Conflict of Cultures

Friction has been the hallmark of Soviet attempts to rechannel ethnic loyalties, with Russians often complaining about official policy as much as non-Russians. If Stalin's Great Russian chauvinism was detested by non-Russians, many Russians found Khrushchev's internationalism offensive.

The very real economic progress made by the non-Russian nationality groups since 1917 has not basically alleviated their sense of discrimination relative to the Great Russians. It has, however, stimulated the familiar rising expectations and made these ethnic groups even more acutely aware of their second-class political and in some cases economic status. And the verbal obeisance that communist doctrine has paid to nationality prerogatives, including the theoretical right of the Union Republics to secede from the USSR, has given the nationality groups a legitimate peg on which to hang their grievances.

The 60-year effort to create something like a new "Soviet" man has fallen far short of the mark. The conclusion of one scholar is probably correct: "All available evidence

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The strong nationalist attitude of the dominant Great Russians also creates problems. Their hegemonic perspective and practices, reinforced by a growing neo-Slavophile movement, are partly fed by a widespread feeling among Russians that they have suffered as a result of raising living standards of the non-Russian minorities. The granting of internal "foreign" aid increases resentments and the ethnic conflict thus feeds upon itself.

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indicates that the rate of growth of the national self-assertion of major Soviet ethnic groups exceeds their rate of assimilation into a common Soviet value system."

C. Division Among Non-Russians

As delicate and complicated as nationality relations are, Moscow's problems have been eased somewhat by the at least partial assimilation into Russian of many minority members, especially among the rising elites. The various levels of Russification among the different peoples in large measure reflect disparate national histories, ethnic groupings, and religious ties.

In part because of these differences, there has been an absence of unified, coordinated, and well organized anti-Russianism. Of course, police repression has contributed to the disjointedness of protest movements, for example the suppression of pan-Turkism. But historic animosities between certain nationalities and the absence of unifying religious, ethnic, and cultural ties among all non-Russians have also played a significant role in vitiating the effectiveness of anti-Russian efforts.

D. Nationlist Demands: More Autonomy, Not Separation

Nationalist/ethnic dissidence has been a recurring phenomenon throughout the 60-year history of the Soviet state as, indeed, it was under the Tsars. It has reached explosive proportions, including movements toward separatists during times of national crisis which afforded special opportunities. When the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917, the Bolsheviks found that only military force was able to reconstitute the national units of the empire, but not in every case. The Finns and the Poles, for example, achieved independence. The three Baltic republics repulsed the Bolshevik efforts and won an interval of republican sovereignty for two decades between the war. The Ukraine was conquered only after a bloody war against the organized Ukrainian government known as the Rada. The Transcaucasus was regained by the Red Army only by 1922, and Central Asia was reconquered later in the 1920s when the local resistance groups were finally crushed.

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During World War II, separatist movements sprang up again in many of these same areas. Masses of Ukrainians surrendered to the invading Germans under the impression that they were liberators from Bolshevism. Many of the Baltic peoples likewise aided the Germans at first when they drove out the Red Army. Moscow's awareness of its vulnerabilities was amply demonstrated by the mass deportations of the Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, small Northern Caucasus peoples, and nationals of the Baltic republics following the latter's absorption by the Soviet Union after the war.

In more normal times separatist movements at times appear of little consequence, although sentiment favoring independence and national sovereignty does occasionally crop up in samizdat literature and is reflected in refutations of such demands in the official media. Separatist demands come especially from areas with traditions of independent statehood, such as the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, the western Ukraine, and Georgia.

The most nationalistic of the Soviet Union's ethnic groups, however, like the Transcaucasian peoples are small and -- realistically speaking -- have no place to go. They might not be viable as independent states in the modern world. The Baltic peoples are better placed and had a period of independence in the interim period. Their economic relationship with the USSR, however, would make them vulnerable to Soviet pressures even as independent countries.

On the other hand, there are several large nationalities having Union-republic status, with borders fronting on independent countries -- such as the Ukraine and Uzbekistan -- which probably could survive as independent, and not just autonomous, states. There are also numerous large as well as small ethnic groups located in the interior which fall somewhere in between, i.e. they have a strong sense of national identity, but the best they can hope for would seem to be greater autonomy.

Though appearances can be deceptive, most of the ethnic areas do not seem to desire real independence. In Central Asia, for example, many seem to derive satisfaction from pragmatically exploiting the Soviet system from within to raise local living standards. They appear to nurse the conviction that Central Asia will rise again to dominate Moscow, as it did during the Middle Ages and therefore

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conclude that struggle for separatism makes no sense. Similarly, most Armenians seem resigned to the fact that with Turkey and Iran to the south no sustained independence is possible and that their best hope is to preserve and enhance their autonomy.

In general, rather than separatism, nationalist aspirations today confront the central regime with a different set of demands:

- better economic treatment from the regime, including increased investment allocations and employment of local nationals in all major positions of responsibility;

- more attention to native language and literature as opposed to the official emphasis on Russian; this concern was recently demonstrated when public dissatisfaction in the Transcaucasus forced the regime to retain Georgian, Armenian, and Azeri as official languages in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaydzhan respectively;

- greater emphasis on national history, tradition, custom, and the local contribution to Soviet achievement instead of the great preeminence given Russia in all these fields;

- support for local religions, often so intermixed with national aspirations as to be indistinguishable in some instances, as opposed to the preeminence enjoyed by the Russian Orthodox Church (to the extent the regime tolerates religious activity); and

- in some cases, nationality groups with significant groups of co-ethnics abroad, which can provide a milie for resettlement, demand the right at least as individuals to emigrate.

In sum, for the most part, the Soviet regime is not confronted with large-scale nationalist pressure for separatism and independent statehood, and is not likely to be except in the most unusual circumstances. Russians, together with the extensively Russified Belorussians and the frequently Russified Ukrainians, have been able to overwhelm the other nationalities by their numbers, relative cultural cohesiveness, and control of the levers of state power. Where local nationalism has led

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to violence, central authorities have shown little hesitation to counter with armed repression, such as in Georgia in 1956, when rioters protested Khrushchev's attacks on native son Stalin, and following Lithuanian anti-Russian outbreaks in 1972 and as it appears in 1977. But in general, Moscow is faced with growing national assertiveness and demands for elimination of the inequalities that exist in almost all spheres: political, economic and cultural. The recent past has shown, however, that even these claims can lead to explosive situations.

E. Emigration: Jews and Germans

Voluntary mass emigrations occurred during both World War I and II. After 1945, however, Moscow, insisting on myth of ethnic harmony within Soviet borders, allowed the emigration of selected national minorities only with great reluctance and with the implicit understanding that those allowed to emigrate were special cases. The official basis for this emigration is family reunification, the precedent for which was set by the repatriation of ethnic groups, such as the Memel Germans, Poles, and Bulgarians, who found themselves on Soviet territory at the end of World War II. But behind this facade has been the reality of a growing sense of ethnic identification combined with increasing injection of aspirations in the Soviet context.

Jewish emigration totaled only about 4500 from 1948 to 1965. In December 1966, however, much to the surprise of Western observers, Premier Kosygin declared that "if any families wish to come together or wish to leave the Soviet Union for them the road is open and no problem exists here." Jewish emigration has grown dramatically since Kosygin's statement, despite the 1967 and 1973 Mideast Wars, from 1400 in 1967 to a high of almost 35 thousand in 1973; dropped to 13,000 in 1975; according to present projections, the 1978 figure will be in the vicinity of 27,000. (The 197 census tallied 2.2 million Jews.) Its rate of flow has been an important factor in US-Soviet trade and credit negotiations and has been stressed in attacks on and in defense of the USSR's human rights record. Internally, emigration has served as a safety valve, a channel through which Soviet authorities can in effect expel individuals too well known in the West to be repressed without publicity. All total, since the resumption of Jewish emigration, some 150,000 have left.

German emigration has been second only to the Jewish wave. It, too, has been stimulated by detente politics. Since 1970, as the Soviets have sought to curry favor with FRG Social

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Democrats, almost 40,000 ethnic Germans -- or of a census total of 1.8 million -- have emigrated. Most of those eligible on the grounds of immediate family reunification are out now. But pressure for emigration has been growing among those with only distant relations abroad or no recognized claims to family reunification. For the most part, they are descendants of eighteenth and nineteenth century settlers and are attempting -- with some success -- to follow the pattern established by the Jews.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND PROGNOSIS

Despite their great experience in grappling with the problem of nationalism neither the Tsars nor the Politburo have found a solution. The likelihood of increasing self-assertiveness on the part of non-Russian minorities, there poses a dilemma for the Soviet regime whose refusal to meet minority aspirations for political, social, and economic equality is likely to provoke further discontent along ethnic lines. And the situation is such that regime concessionary policies might only sharpen appetites, and possibly open the floodgates for major change.

In any event, the Kremlin has devised an elaborate machinery for controlling nationalism and, whenever necessary, for suppressing violent outbreaks. The secret police, the army, the party, and the entire cultural and educational establishments are organizationally structured to cope with the problems caused by nationalism, including scattered flare-ups as well as the long grinding work of indoctrination.

It would appear that the Soviet regime will be able to keep the forces of nationalism under control at least over the next several years without special difficulty. Nevertheless outbreaks of individual and mass violence can break out in this period just as they have occurred in the recent past. Soviet concern, especially on the part of the police and central authorities, will be heightened by each incident. But no significant departure from the existing mechanisms of control is foreseen -- and no serious threat to regime stability appears likely.

The picture is murkier over the next 15-20 years. Demographic and related economic trends may well force the regime to alter some tactics. If major warfare puts severe strains on the fabric of Soviet society, those nationality problems which are manageable today could well prove unmanageable.

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The Soviet Union is vulnerable to the climate and pressure of international opinion, inter alia, because it is doing its utmost to project a favorable image abroad as a model for the world to follow, especially in the Third World where nationalist fervor is strong. Repressive treatment of nationality groups will have increased resonance abroad, possibly adversely affecting Soviet relations with countries sharing the same nationality group, certainly tarnishing the image the Soviet Union wishes to project. (The highly negative impact the question of Jewish emigration has had on US-Soviet relations is well known.)


These factors may become critical in connection with Moscow's handling of its growing Muslim minority in Central Asia. Moscow in the past has used the "Board of Moslems for Central Asia and Kazakhstan" to promote friendly ties with Moslem countries. The utility of this practice will diminish if Moscow pursues repressive measures against its Muslims, who may well be increasingly supported by the Middle East countries.

The sensitive question of border security with China will also affect Soviet treatment of the large minorities which the USSR shares with that country. Too harsh and resistant an attitude toward these minorities could increase Peking's trouble-making potential.

* * * * *

It seems likely the Soviet leadership will pursue a combination of carrot and stick policies in the future to moderate and control its ethnic minorities. Concessions to national sensibilities, especially their aspiration for greater autonomy, are probable, but most likely to be very limited. Stern, repressive measures and if necessary the full application of force at the regime's disposal, will be brought into play to suppress ethnic turbulence. The Politburo is far better equipped than were the Tsars to repress dissent though it has no better solutions than its predecessors to the problem of nationalism.

Ethno-Demographic Trends in Soviet Population



NATIONALITY COMPOSITION OF THE USSR

(According to the 1970 census)

Ethnic Groups	Population in millions
Russians	129.0
Ukrainians	40.8
Uzbeks	9.2
Belorussians	9.1
Tatars	5.9
Kazakhs	5.3
Azerbaydzhani	4.4
Armenians	3.6
Georgians	3.2
Moldavians	2.7
Lithuanians	2.7
Jews	2.2
Tadzhiks	2.1
Germans	1.8
Chuvashi	1.7
Turkmen	1.5
Kirgiz	1.5
Latvians	1.4
Mordvinians	1.3
Bashkirs	1.2
Poles	1.2
Estonians	1.0

All Others

8.9

Total Population

241.7

Russian SFSR

1. Russian	82.8%
2. Tatar	3.7%
3. Ukrainian	2.6%
4. Chuvash	1.3%
5. Other	9.6%

Ukrainian SSR

1. Ukrainian	74.9%
2. Russian	19.4%
3. Jewish	1.6%
4. Other	4.1%

Belorussian SSR

1. Belorussian	81.0%
2. Russian	10.4%
3. Polish	4.3%
4. Ukrainian	2.1%
5. Jewish	1.6%
6. Other	4.6%

Uzbek SSR

1. Uzbek	65.5%
2. Russian	12.5%
3. Tatar	4.9%
4. Kazakh	4.0%
5. Tadzhik	3.8%
6. Other	9.3%

Kazakh SSR

1. Kazakh	32.6%
2. Russian	42.4%
3. Ukrainian	7.2%
4. German	6.6%
5. Other	11.2%

Georgian SSR

1. Georgian	66.8%
2. Armenian	9.7%
3. Russian	8.5%
4. Azerbaydzhan	4.6%
5. Osetian	3.2%
6. Other	7.2%

Total population: 130,079,210

Russian as 1st language: 113,135,541
Russian as 2nd language: 12,045,38

Total Population: 47,126,51

Ukrainian as 1st language: 32,701,96
Russian as 1st language: 13,253,84

Total Population: 9,002,33

Belorussian as 1st language: 6,899,08
Russian as 1st language: 1,907,61

Total Population: 11,799,42

Uzbek as 1st language: 7,711,31
Russian as 1st language: 1,762,77

Total Population: 13,008,72

Kazakh as 1st language: 4,199,74
Russian as 1st language: 6,555,45

Total Population: 4,686,35

Georgian as 1st language: 3,225,54
Russian as 1st language: 521,14

Azerbaijani SSR

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Total Population: 5,117,081

1. Azerbaydzhan' 73.8%
2. Russian 10.0%
3. Armenian 9.4%
4. Other 6.8%

Azerbaydzhan as 1st
language: 3,751,786
Russian as 1st
language: 683,246

Lithuanian SSR

1. Lithuanian 80.1%
2. Russian 8.6%
3. Polish 7.7%
4. Other 3.6%

Total Population: 3,128,236

Lithuanian as 1st
language: 2,511,167
Russian as 1st
language: 317,491

Moldavian SSR

1. Moldavian 64.6%
2. Ukrainian 14.2%
3. Russian 11.6%
4. Jewish 2.7%
5. Bolgar 2.1%
6. Other 4.8%

Total Population: 3,568,873

Moldavian as 1st
language: 2,265,284
Russian as 1st
language: 637,096

Latvian SSR

1. Latvian 56.8%
2. Russian 29.8%
3. Belorussian 4.0%
4. Polish 2.7%
5. Ukrainian 2.3%
6. Other 4.4%

Total Population: 2,364,127

Latvian as 1st
language: 1,344,596
Russian as 1st
language: 848,546

Kirgiz SSR

1. Kirgiz 43.8%
2. Russian 29.2%
3. Uzbek 11.3%
4. Ukrainian 4.1%
5. German 3.1%
6. Tatar 2.4%
7. Other 6.1%

Total Population: 2,932,805

Kirgiz as 1st
language: 1,290,809
Russian as 1st
language: 983,363

Tadzhik SSR

1. Tadzhik 56.2%
2. Uzbek 23.0%
3. Russian 11.9%
4. Tatar 2.4%
5. Other 6.5%

Total Population: 2,899,602

Tadzhik as 1st
language: 1,632,840
Russian as 1st
language: 405,779

1.	Armenian	88.6%
2.	Azerbaijani	5.9%
3.	Russian	2.7%
4.	Kurd	1.5%
5.	Other	1.3%

Total Population: 2,491,873

Armenian as 1st language:	2,207,860
Russian as 1st language:	76,427

Turkmen SSR

1.	Turkmen	65.6%
2.	Russian	14.5%
3.	Uzbek	8.3%
4.	Kazakh	3.2%
5.	Other	8.4%

Total Population: 2,158,880

Turkmen as 1st language:	1,413,262
Russian as 1st language:	368,175

Estonian SSR

1.	Estonian	68.2%
2.	Russian	24.7%
3.	Other	7.1%

Total Population: 1,356,079

Estonian as 1st language:	930,686
Russian as 1st language:	374,059



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N O D I S

INCREASING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDING
OF THE SOVIET NATIONALITIES

Problem

How to improve coordination, increase funding and focus greater attention within the United States Government on Soviet nationality problems.

Background

A study by the interagency working group demonstrates that USG resources and personnel devoted to analysis and study of the Soviet nationalities is small to almost non-existent. Within the Government, major agencies working on research and analysis on Soviet nationalities are the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) in the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of the Census in the Department of Commerce, the Library of Congress, and the International Communications Agency. Each devotes a small percentage of its time and personnel to obtaining or analyzing information on the Soviet nationalities but none has the resources at present to permit even one full-time employee to conduct full-time nationalities research without unacceptable curtailment of other work.

There being no central repository for nationality-oriented research studies and other information, the data base within the Government on the Soviet nationalities is scattered among agencies resulting in duplication and inefficient efforts. The present mechanism for reporting and coordinating government sponsored research in this area is weak and largely unused. Any effort to develop a fuller and more systematic data base would probably require additional funds and personnel in interested agencies.

Several agencies, including the Departments of State and Defense, CIA and ICA, are capable of funding external research on the Soviet nationalities but none current places special emphasis on such research. Moreover, there is no effective



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As the number of able young scholars in this field has increased, there has been some limited increase in interaction between such persons and interested Government officials. However, such interaction could be improved by relatively modest USG efforts to support existing academic centers and by greater support of external research by nationality scholars.

Background Study

Attached for SCC consideration is a background paper on Nationalism in the USSR prepared by State/INR which has been cleared with all interested agencies. This paper notes that nationality questions have been a recurrent problem throughout Soviet and Russian history and that, in light of ongoing social and demographic changes in the USSR, such problems and the domestic policy difficulties they pose the Soviet leadership are likely to increase. Because of the importance of nationality questions to the future of the Soviet Union and the absence of a fully articulated USG policy toward the nationalities, increased USG understanding of nationality issues seems highly appropriate.

Recommendation

That the background study on Nationalism in the USSR be approved by the SCC as the basis upon which further USG efforts to increase our understanding of nationality issues be based.

Action Program

On the basis of papers submitted by participating agencies, the working group has developed a work program to strengthen USG knowledge and expertise in the nationality area in light of the importance which nationality questions are likely to have in the near-term future for the Soviet Union.

Recommendations

Public exposure of high-level USG interest in the Soviet nationalities would be a matter of potentially great sensitivity in our relations with the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is a sine qua non of USG activity in this area that

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all actions approved by the SCC concerning the nationalities be handled with extreme discretion by interested agencies. Contacts with individuals or organizations outside government must be pursued in such a way that the overall scope of the USG effort in this area not be exposed.

It is also important that, in increasing USG resources devoted to the examination of the Soviet nationalities problem, we avoid a scattershot approach. We must seek to insure maximum interagency coordination in the pursuit of knowledge and establishment of research priorities concerning the nationalities.


With these preliminary comments, the following recommendations for improving USG information on the nationalities are offered for SCC consideration:

a) That an interagency working group be established to

--set priorities and estimate costs involved in the expansion of USG knowledge and research, including intelligence collection, regarding the Soviet nationalities;

--survey USG assets including research holdings and language capable, academically-trained personnel in the nationalities area.

b) That INR and CIA increase funding of external research on Soviet nationalities and that they increase their present liaison efforts with private organizations and academia with due regard for the high sensitivity of public exposure of the overall USG effort; STATSPEC



d) That ICA and the Board for International Broadcasting be tasked with an assessment of how they might expand programming should their resources in this area be increased in the future.

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e) That NFIB agencies be requested to raise the priority assigned to collection of intelligence information about Soviet nationality issues.

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
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2. (S) Competition for Agency resources is very keen, and I do not believe the coverage of this target would do well in the competition. I doubt whether decision packages on this target would have been included in the 1980 program nor would it be funded among the unfunded requirements for 1978. DCID 1/2 ranks the intelligence needs for this target very low, 6 on a scale of 7.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM :
Comptroller

SUBJECT : SCC Proposal—Increasing Understanding of Soviet
Nationals (S)

1. (S) The proposal before the SCC explores how to improve coordination, increase funding, and focus greater attention within the USG on Soviet nationality problems. It recommends:

- reordering intelligence and foreign affairs priorities;
- increasing funding for external research;
- accumulating under INR all information on Soviet nationalities;
- increasing monitoring and analysis;
- developing a core group of language qualified foreign service officers who specialize in Soviet nationality affairs;
- increasing CIA collection on this subject; and
- holding US policy constant until this study is completed.

2. (S) DCID 1/2 ranks the need for intelligence on the Soviet nationalities target 6 on a scale of 7. This appears an appropriately low priority, considering everything else we have to do. The competition for Agency positions and funds is very keen. Based on our recent experience with the 1980 program and the 2 percent personnel reduction ordered for 1979, I believe resources for coverage of this target () cannot be included in the Agency's 1980 recommended program. In addition, resources for the Agency's covert action program are very limited.

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RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE

Armenian SSR	-	KOMMUNIST
Azerbaijan SSR	-	BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY
Belorussian SSR	-	SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
Estonian SSR	-	SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
Georgian SSR	-	ZARYA VOSTOKA
Karakh SSR	-	KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
Kirgiz SSR	-	SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
Latvian SSR	-	SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
Lithuanian SSR	-	SOVETSKAYA LITVA
Moldavian SSR	-	SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
RSFSR	-	SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
Tadzhik SSR	-	KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA
Turkmen SSR	-	TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
Ukrainian SSR	-	PRAVDA UKRAINY
Uzbek SSR	-	PRAVDA VOSTOKA

VERNACULAR

Belorussian SSR	-	ZVYAZDA
Lithuanian SSR	-	TIESA
Ukrainian SSR:		RADYANSKA UKRAINA MOLOD UKRAINY LITERATURNIA UKRAINA KULTURA I ZHYTTYA VITCHIZNA UKRAINSKIY ISTORICHNYI ZHURNAL FILOSOFSKA DUMKA ZHOVTEN VISNYK AKADEMII NAUK UKR. SSR

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13 July 1978

25X1A MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
C/IAD/CA

25X1A FROM : [REDACTED]
C/P&M/USSR/OCR

SUBJECT : OCR Intelligence Document Holdings on
Soviet Nationalities Problems

1. In the meeting that I attended in your office on 27 June, you asked that information on OCR intelligence document holdings be presented in terms of past, present and possible future document reference programs.

2. In OCR, "the past" means prior to 1968, the year OCR reorganized and old systems of document indexing, storage and retrieval were discontinued. The old systems are no longer practical to use in surveying OCR holdings on a particular subject, but their availability and degree of utility are relevant to the needs of researchers on nationality problems who may want to go back that far. The best research tool for pre-1968 data on this particular topic is the old Intelligence Publications Index; it and the other retrieval tools of that era are described below.

INTELLOFAX--inactive computer-based document reference file; collateral only; information reports primarily but some finished intelligence (1948-1960 but IPI--see below--better source for 1953-60); data from 1947 thru 1967; listings, in three sorts, give document numbers and codes searched (first page of document no longer provided). Product is just list of numbers; to verify relevance, each document would have to be pulled.

KEYWORD TITLES INDICES--listings of codeword document titles and document numbers by keyword and series; reports and finished intelligence; data from 1950 thru 1967.

SUBJECT/COMMODITY FILE--inactive computer-based document reference file; codeword only; reports only; data input 1950-1967.

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SUBJECT: OCR Intelligence Document Holdings on Soviet Nationalities Problems

INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS INDEX (IPI)--inactive published index of finished intelligence; collateral only; data from 1953 thru 1967; index in 6-month increments by subject and country; copies of index available in various intelligence agencies as well as CIA.

3. At present, the principal OCR information storage and retrieval system is the computer based document reference file called AEGIS/RECON. Other major files are manual collections on Soviet personalities, organizations and locations. What follows is (a) a description of AEGIS/RECON and how document references get put into it, and (b) a brief overview of the documents in the file that concern Soviet nationalities problems.

a. AEGIS/RECON contains references to both finished intelligence and information reports, and both collateral and codeword reports. It provides indexing coverage since 1968 of intelligence documents issued by CIA, State, DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, NSA, NPIC and other major intelligence sources of the United States [redacted]. Open literature, non-CIA cables, and FBIS reporting are included on a selective basis only. The system functions on the basis of gross subject/area documents categorization plus selective keywords from the titles and texts of the documents. Place names for the USSR (and for China) are indexed when significant. The listings that are produced from RECON in response to subject queries display document titles, keywords added by indexers, document numbers, publication dates and other bibliographic data. Because the indexing is relatively shallow, the listings must contain some references not directly relevant to the query in order to be inclusive. The system provides for flexibility and can be adapted to changing intelligence needs. Indexing of incoming documents is done by document analysts and reviewed by subject/area analysts. The latter make decisions to initiate the indexing process on information not automatically indexed (State cables, FBIS reporting, academic papers, key newspaper reports, etc.).

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b. I queried the RECON file using the subject code for minorities, the location code for USSR, and a number of applicable keywords (ethnic, national(-ity, -ities, -ism), minorit(-y, -ies), language, Russification, Sovietization,

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SUBJECT: OCR Intelligence Document Holdings on Soviet Nationalities Problems

repression, discrimination, etc.). The result was a listing of about 1500 titles for the period 1968 to the present, including several dozen codeword references. After excluding those that dealt with

- specifically Jewish problems in the USSR,
- religious minorities only,
- Soviet relations with nationality groups abroad (Kurds),
- dissident activity with no reference to nationalities, and
- *samizdat* activity with no reference to nationalities,

there were about 750 relevant titles. I noticed that a healthy portion of these were Defense Department reports that were based on data from low-level defectors and produced in response to a standard collection query on the ethnic makeup of military units and installations. There seemed also to be a disproportionately large number of documents dealing with ethnic Germans in the USSR, probably inflated by reporting relayed from [] sources. The rest of the 750 titles covered a broad spectrum of nationality problems and documentary sources. Several dozen were unclassified academic papers acquired by State, articles by Radio Liberty authors, and RAND Corporation reports.

4. At our meeting we discussed the special relevance of academic papers on nationality problems. Published papers, of course, can be retrieved by traditional library research methods. Unpublished ones get into OCR intelligence document files in two ways:

- They are acquired by State Department and sent to us in a special program called Foreign Affairs Research (FAR). Some of these are indexed for AEGIS/RECON, while others are merely stored in microform. State is currently preparing cumulative subject indexes of these reports.
- They fall into the hands of an interested OCR analyst (through attendance at conferences, etc.) and are indexed.

SUBJECT: OCR Intelligence Document Holdings on Soviet
Nationalities Problems

5. For the immediate future, I see no method of improving our data base of intelligence documents on nationality problems except by improving receipts. Once received by OCR, the documents are, it seems to me, easily retrieved by interested researchers. We could increase the number of discretionary items selected by OCR reference analysts above and beyond the documents that receive regular indexing, but there are limits to how effective that can be. The selection of large numbers of State Department cables could clog the system with ephemeral data that is often represented later in finished reports; FBIS reporting is indexed by a commercial firm, and overselection here could be counterproductive also; newspaper items, of course, are retrievable by other means, e.g., the computerized *New York Times* Data Bank. The question of unpublished academic papers seems to be one that can be further explored. You and I know how rapidly copies of good papers vanish at AAASS conferences. I suspect that State's FAR system acquires only a few of the academic papers that are relevant. Finally, there can be no centralized retrieval of those DDO intelligence documents that DDO does not disseminate to OCR in the first place.

6. As for future technologies of information retrieval, the computerized SAFE system (which is in development but does not yet exist except in prototype form) will greatly multiply the power of individual analysts to acquire, store, select, index, manipulate and retrieve intelligence data relevant to their field of interest. I mention this only because you charged me with describing the future. The immediate practical questions are addressed in paragraph 5 above.

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SUBJECT: OCR Intelligence Document Holdings on Soviet
Nationalities Problems

as we can; of course, under the circumstances they are mostly Jewish rather than strictly national minorities, but there are some of the latter. OCR also periodically issues a study, *Foreign Dissident Groups*, and among the groups we have identified are some that are religious and nationalistic in nature (see attached pages). The point is that there is more than one string to OCR's bow, as many Agency researchers can tell you.

8. I hope this memo is of some use to you. Please let me know if I can be of further help.



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Attachment:
As stated

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USSR

ORGANIZATION	REMARKS
<u>Human Rights (Democratic) Movement</u>	<i>Dissident groups within the Soviet Union can be classified into roughly four types: human rights, religious, nationalistic, and cultural. Individuals often belong to more than one group. Some groups are identified only by the name of the publication to which members contribute anonymously; known as samizdat or "self-publishing," these publications have become an informal underground press of considerable proportions.</i>
esty International-- Chapter	Est 1973, officially recognized by London HQ in Sep 74; supports Universal Declaration of Human Rights re rights and welfare of polit prisoners. Leaders: Valentin F. Turchin, Andrey N. Tverdokhlebov, Vladimir Ya. Al'brekht.
Chronicle of Current Events (Khronika)	Est Apr 1968; liberal-dem underground journal; lists human rights violations in Soviet Union; the most persistent known dissident activity in USSR.
Committee for Human Rights	Est Nov 1970; dem; small group of academics working for human rights within Soviet legal system. Unauthorized pub, <i>Social Problems</i> , now defunct.

USSR (cont.)

ORGANIZATION	REMARKS
CSCE Monitoring Group (Orlov Group). Three chapters: Moscow, Ukraine, Lithuania	Est May 1976; compiles instances of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and human rights violations to be passed to foreign govts and citizens. Also known as Orlov Group after its chairman, Yuriy Orlov, a physicist; other mbrs: Petr Grigorenko; Yelena Bonner Sakharov, Aleksandr Marchenko, Aleksandr Ginsburg, Aleksandr Korchat (Orlov and Ginsburg imprisoned since Feb 1977).
Refusniks	Est c.Mar 1972; mainly Jewish scientists dismissed from posts after being refused emigration; a small faction ("Sunday Seminar") holds weekly seminar on humanitarian and scientific themes. Leaders: Mark Azbel; Viktor Braylovskiy; Venyamin Fayn; Aleksandr Voronel; Anatoliy Shcharanskiy (imprisoned Mar 1977).
Sakharov, Andrey D.	Academician and physicist, "father of the Russian H-bomb"; a leading spokesman of dissent, argues for polit liberalization; founding mbr of Committee for Human Rights.
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I.	Nobel laureate for literature; exiled. Has appealed to world opinion on issue of suppression of individuality; has defended other dissidents. Currently has perm resident alien status in US.
Working Group on Soviet Psychiatric Practices	Est Jan 1977 to publicize in West abuses of psychiatry in Soviet Union. Close ties to USSR Chapter of Amnesty Int'l. Leaders: Vyacheslav Bukhmin, Irina Kaplun, Petr Grigorenko, Sofiya Kallistratova.

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USSR (cont.)

ORGANIZATION	REMARKS
<u>Religious Groups</u>	
<i>Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church</i>	Unauthorized pub; surfaced 1972; details violations of human rights in Lithuania; resembles <i>Khronika</i> in format and content.
Evangelical Christian-Baptists, Initsiativniki	One of the most determined dissident religious mvmts; militantly opposed to govt religious policies. Have org a Council of Relatives of Christian Baptist Prisoners in the Soviet Union; Council's pub: <i>Byulleten'</i> . Leaders: Vladimir Khaylo, Nikolay Baturin, Georgiy Vins (in prison since Feb 1975).
Harald of Truth (<i>Vestnik Istiny</i>)	Journal first pub Sep 1976 by Union of Evangelical Christian-Baptists Churches; successor to <i>Vestnik Spaseniya</i> (Herald of Salvation) which began c.1962.
Evangelical Christian Faith/Pentacostals (ECV/P)	Works for emigration of believers and the right to practice their religion within the USSR.
Exodous (<i>Iskhod</i>)	Organ of Soviet Zionists; primary focus is emigration to Israel.
Jews in the USSR (<i>Yevrey v SSSR</i>)	Hand-written magazine est 1973 to perpetuate nat'l consciousness of Jews in the USSR. Leaders: Aleksandr Voronel Viktor Yakhot.
<u>Nationalist Movement</u>	
The Dawn (<i>Ausra</i>)	Lithuanian pub est Oct 1975; ally of <i>Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church</i> ; pub to counteract distortion of Lithuanian history and comment on nat'l issues.

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USSR (cont.)

ORGANIZATION	REMARKS
Crimean Tatars	In May 1944 deported en bloc from Crimea to Uzbekistan and Central Asia; rehabilitated in Sep 1967 but not permitted to return home; since 1956 conduct mass campaigns for restoration of rights and/or emigration to Turkey and West Germany; claim to number 300,000-350,000. Leading figure: Mustafa Dzhemilev (imprisoned).
Ethnic German Action Committee	Est in Estonia Oct 1969; in 1971 spread to Latvia; in 1972 to Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan and Kazakhstan; in 1973 to Uzbekistan; informs ethnic Germans in USSR of best methods and locations for emigration. Spokesmen claim 40,000 adherents; one faction supports est of German republic within USSR.
Movement for Ukrainian National Rights	Moderates in Ukraine devoted to that republic's civil rights.
<u>Cultural Freedom Movement</u>	
"Unofficial Artists"	Group of artists whose work is not approved by Soviet govt; org unofficial exhibits of their works. Leaders: Oskar Rabin; Iosif Kiblitiski.
Action Group for the Defense of Civil Rights	Est 1969; dem; small reform org working for civil rights promised in constitution; currently leaderless.
<i>Demokrat</i>	Pub of anti-Semitic, reactionary group seeking to form clandestine network in USSR; has existed since 1969 as splinter group within dissident mvmt; has been criticized in <i>Khronika</i> .

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USSR (cont.)

ORGANIZATION	REMARKS
National Labor Alliance (Natsional'no-Trudovoy Soyuz)	Russian emigres, HQ W. Germany; goal is popular overthrow of Soviet regime or forcible reform inside USSR.
Political Diary (<i>Politicheskiy Dnevnik</i>)	Est 1964; unauthorized montly news-letter by handful of loyal Sov liberal-Marxist intellectuals who wish to influence policy; ceased pub 1970.
Ukrainian Herald (<i>Ukrainskiy Vysnyk</i>)	Est Jan 1970; Ukrainian nat'list; protested Soviet Russification; unauthorized pub stopped Jan 1972 amid arrests of Ukrainian dissidents. Chief ed: Mykola Kholodnyy-Plakhotnyuk.
Veche	Est early 1971; Great-Russian chauvinist; Slavophile, conservative, anti-Semitic; unofficial pub named after popular assembly in old Russia. Chief ed: Vladimir Osipov.

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Answer: The Army produces a psyops study on a section of the USSR approximately every six months. Latvia is the area currently under study.

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


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WASHINGTON

August 2, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:

NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEF OF STAFFS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Consolidated Presidential Finding

Congressmen Boland, Aspin and Wilson of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have written to the President to suggest certain changes in the new consolidated Presidential Finding provided to Congress under the Hughes-Ryan reporting requirement (see attached letter). I have advised them that this matter will be referred to the SCC for appropriate action and have added it to the agenda for the August 10 SCC meeting.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

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CLASSIFIED BY Z. Brzezinski
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY () 5B () 5C () 5D () 5E
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, WIS.
 BILL D. BRADISON, MO.
 MORGAN J. MURPHY, ILL.
 LES ASPIN, WIS.
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THOMAS K. LATIMER, STAFF DIRECTOR
 MICHAEL J. O'NEIL, CHIEF COUNSEL

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
 ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

July 28, 1978

The President
 The White House
 Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing with reference to your June 7, 1978
 "Omnibus Finding" concerning CIA special activities.

Section F, the Worldwide part of this Finding, reads
 in applicable part:

F. WORLDWIDE Under guidelines cleared with
 the Department of State, and when time is of the
 essence under specific guidance from the Assistant
 to the President for National Security Affairs, in
 which case the Secretary of State shall be promptly
 notified, provide:

b. similar support, not amounting to
 a separate major initiative, to counter foreign
 domestic terrorist movements or organizations
 employing violent means which threaten the politi-
 cal stability of governments designated by the
 Department of State in cleared guidelines.

This language, which is new, was included to allow the
 CIA, with the approval of the Department of State, to
 "respond affirmatively to routine requests for counter-
 terrorist assistance", even though the foreign terrorist
 activity at issue may be wholly domestic in character.

Some of the undersigned have expressed concern over
 the CIA's inability to respond quickly to the request by

[Redacted]

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[REDACTED]

We are sympathetic to the CIA's desire for flexibility to respond to sudden developments abroad, but we are doubtful that reliance on generic Findings, which permit decisions at a later date, is the proper approach to take. We are not worried about the designation of the [REDACTED] perhaps the [REDACTED] under this subparagraph. It is the hard cases which may stray close to internal political dissent or impinge on internationally recognized human rights which trouble us and which we feel ought to receive the President's full scrutiny.

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Accordingly, it is our recommendation that subparagraph (b.) be eliminated and that specific findings be required in its place whenever a foreign domestic terrorist group is identified as to which CIA may lend assistance to foreign governments.

We note with appreciation the offer of John McMahon, Deputy Director for Operations of the CIA, to notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence whenever a foreign domestic terrorist group is identified pursuant to subparagraph (b.). We feel it is important, however, to reemphasize the original intent of the Hughes-Ryan amendment (22 USC 2422) - i.e., that the President approve covert actions which are important to the national security and that the Congress be informed of those covert actions in a timely fashion. Lending assistance to foreign governments when foreign domestic terrorism is the target seems to us important enough to justify a full Presidential review and a specific Finding under the Hughes-Ryan language.

In sum, we ask you to give this issue a further examination, and we hope that in so doing you will come to the same conclusion we have: subparagraph (b.) of the new Finding is inappropriate. The proper approach is a case-by-case Finding for each foreign domestic group which the CIA finds necessary to target for counterterrorist purposes. Neither are such groups too plentiful nor the amount of time too small for this more prudent step to succeed.


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
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The language of Hughes-Ryan makes the Congress a partner, albeit an uncertain one, in the covert action process. This letter offers our suggestion for another look at the scope of these special activities. We trust you will accept it as a constructive comment on your Administration's laudable effort to rewrite previous Findings.

Sincerely,


EDWARD P. BOLAND
Chairman


LES ASPIN


BOB WILSON

cc: Admiral Turner

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SUBJECT: Submission to Special Coordination Committee of
Proposed Covert Action - [redacted]

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Concur:

[redacted]

Deputy Director for Operations

/s/ Frank C. Carlucci

2 AUG 1978

Date

3 AUG 1978

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date

Approved for release to the Special Coordination Committee:

/s/ Stansfield Turner

4 AUG 1978

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

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DDO/AF/HC/ [redacted] (27 July 1978) (X-1680)

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